.env.example

@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ PRONOTE_AUTH_MODE=password
 # PRONOTE_QR_CODE_FILE=/path/to/qr_code.json
 # PRONOTE_QR_PIN=
 # Valeur à définir localement dans .env ; ne jamais la committer.
+# PIN de second facteur du compte Pronote, distinct du PIN de déchiffrement du QR code
+# PRONOTE_ACCOUNT_PIN=
 
 # --- CalDAV ---
 CALDAV_URL=https://caldav.example.com/calendars/user/pronote/

AGENTS.md

@@ -230,7 +230,8 @@ def fetch_ical(url: str) -> str:
 - **Masquage** : Utiliser systématiquement `redact_url()`, `redact_secrets()`, et `redact_exception()` depuis `utils/redaction.py`.
 - **Chaînage d'exceptions** : Ne jamais conserver comme `__cause__` ou `__context__` une exception
   externe brute susceptible de contenir un secret. Journaliser la version expurgée puis utiliser
-  `raise ... from None`, ou chaîner une cause elle-même expurgée.
+  `raise ... from None` hors du bloc `except` (car `from None` seul laisse
+  l'exception externe dans `__context__`), ou chaîner une cause elle-même expurgée.
 - **Tests de non-fuite** : Vérifier les messages, les logs, `__cause__`, `__context__` et le
   traceback complet avec des sentinelles distinctes pour chaque secret.
 

docs/exploitation.md

@@ -66,6 +66,12 @@ processus. Le mode `PRONOTE_AUTH_MODE=qr_token` est incompatible avec cette gara
 le refuse avant toute connexion afin de ne pas désynchroniser le token local du token distant.
 Le dry-run ne remplace pas une vérification des paramètres réellement chargés.
 
+En mode `PRONOTE_AUTH_MODE=qr_token`, `PRONOTE_QR_PIN` déchiffre le QR code
+exporté depuis le site web Pronote. Si le compte exige un second facteur,
+configurez aussi `PRONOTE_ACCOUNT_PIN` avec le PIN du compte. Ce PIN est
+transmis uniquement à `pronotepy` lors de l'enrôlement QR et des connexions par
+token ; il n'est jamais écrit dans `.pronote_auth_state.json` ni dans les logs.
+
 Si le blog RSS est activé, ses GUID ne sont acquittés qu'après confirmation de
 l'envoi XMPP. Un refus, une exception, l'absence de canal ou un `--dry-run`
 laisse donc les articles récupérables à l'exécution suivante ; les en-têtes

pronote_sync/config/settings.py

@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ class PronoteSettings(BaseSettings):
     auth_mode: Literal["password", "qr_token"] = "password"
     qr_code_file: str | None = None
     qr_pin: SecretStr | None = None
+    account_pin: SecretStr | None = None
 
     @field_serializer("ical_url")
     def _serialize_ical_url(self, value: SecretStr | None) -> str | None:
@@ -72,6 +73,18 @@ class PronoteSettings(BaseSettings):
             return None
         return "**********"
 
+    @field_serializer("account_pin")
+    def _serialize_account_pin(self, value: SecretStr | None) -> str | None:
+        """Masque le PIN du compte lors de la sérialisation.
+
+        :param value: Valeur du PIN de second facteur du compte.
+        :return: ``"**********"`` si la valeur est définie, ``None`` sinon.
+        :rtype: str | None
+        """
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        return "**********"
+
 
 class CalDAVSettings(BaseSettings):
     """Paramètres d'accès au serveur CalDAV de destination.
@@ -328,6 +341,7 @@ class Settings(BaseSettings):
             self.pronote.ical_url,
             self.pronote.password,
             self.pronote.qr_pin,
+            self.pronote.account_pin,
             self.caldav.url,
             self.caldav.password,
             self.xmpp.password,

pronote_sync/sources/pronote/client.py

@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@ def _collect_auth_secrets(client: PronoteClient) -> list[str]:
     # PIN QR
     if settings.qr_pin is not None:
         secrets.append(settings.qr_pin.get_secret_value())
+    # PIN de second facteur du compte
+    if settings.account_pin is not None:
+        secrets.append(settings.account_pin.get_secret_value())
     # Contenu du fichier QR (jeton, login, url)
     if settings.qr_code_file is not None:
         try:
@@ -336,8 +339,14 @@ class PronoteClient:
         if self._auth_state is not None:
             creds = self._auth_state.load()
             if creds is not None:
+                rotation_error: PronoteAuthRotationError | None = None
                 try:
-                    client = client_class.token_login(**creds)
+                    account_pin = (
+                        self._settings.account_pin.get_secret_value()
+                        if self._settings.account_pin is not None
+                        else None
+                    )
+                    client = client_class.token_login(**creds, account_pin=account_pin)
                     if client.logged_in:
                         self._client = client
                         self._persist_credentials()
@@ -356,12 +365,16 @@ class PronoteClient:
                         redact_exception(exc, extra_secrets=_collect_auth_secrets(self)),
                     )
                     # Token expiré/invalide — pas de repli vers l'enrôlement QR
-                    raise PronoteAuthRotationError(
+                    rotation_error = PronoteAuthRotationError(
                         "Le token d'authentification Pronote est expiré ou invalide. "
                         "Action requise : supprimez le fichier .pronote_auth_state.json "
                         "et relancez avec un nouveau QR code (PRONOTE_QR_CODE_FILE + "
                         "PRONOTE_QR_PIN)."
-                    ) from None
+                    )
+                if rotation_error is not None:
+                    # Lever hors du bloc ``except`` évite de conserver l'erreur
+                    # externe dans ``__context__``.
+                    raise rotation_error from None
 
         # Enrôlement : premier login via QR code (aucun credential persisté)
         client = self._enroll_qr_code(client_class)
@@ -396,6 +409,7 @@ class PronoteClient:
             ) from None
 
         # Read and validate QR code JSON
+        read_error: PronoteAuthRotationError | None = None
         try:
             qr_path = Path(qr_file)
             qr_data: Any = json.loads(qr_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
@@ -405,10 +419,14 @@ class PronoteClient:
                 redact_secrets(qr_file, extra_secrets=_collect_auth_secrets(self)),
                 redact_exception(exc, extra_secrets=_collect_auth_secrets(self)),
             )
-            raise PronoteAuthRotationError(
+            read_error = PronoteAuthRotationError(
                 "Impossible de lire le fichier QR code : "
                 f"{redact_secrets(qr_file, extra_secrets=_collect_auth_secrets(self))}"
-            ) from None
+            )
+        if read_error is not None:
+            # Lever hors du bloc ``except`` évite de conserver l'erreur
+            # externe dans ``__context__``.
+            raise read_error from None
 
         # Validate required keys
         for key in ("login", "jeton", "url"):
@@ -420,22 +438,33 @@ class PronoteClient:
         pin_value = qr_pin.get_secret_value()
         app_uuid = f"pronote-sync-{uuid4().hex}"
 
+        enrollment_error: PronoteAuthRotationError | None = None
         try:
+            account_pin = (
+                self._settings.account_pin.get_secret_value()
+                if self._settings.account_pin is not None
+                else None
+            )
             client = client_class.qrcode_login(
                 qr_code=qr_data,
                 pin=pin_value,
                 uuid=app_uuid,
+                account_pin=account_pin,
             )
         except Exception as exc:
             logger.error(
                 "Échec de l'enrôlement QR : %s",
                 redact_exception(exc, extra_secrets=_collect_auth_secrets(self)),
             )
-            raise PronoteAuthRotationError(
+            enrollment_error = PronoteAuthRotationError(
                 "Échec de l'enrôlement par QR code : PIN invalide ou QR code expiré. "
                 "Générez un nouveau QR code dans l'application Pronote et mettez à "
                 "jour PRONOTE_QR_CODE_FILE."
-            ) from None
+            )
+        if enrollment_error is not None:
+            # Lever hors du bloc ``except`` évite de conserver l'erreur
+            # externe dans ``__context__``.
+            raise enrollment_error from None
 
         return client
 

tests/unit/test_config.py

@@ -207,6 +207,23 @@ def test_qr_pin_in_redaction_secrets(monkeypatch: MonkeyPatch) -> None:
     assert "**********" in repr(settings.pronote.qr_pin)
 
 
+def test_account_pin_loaded_as_secretstr_and_redacted(monkeypatch: MonkeyPatch) -> None:
+    """Vérifie que ``PRONOTE_ACCOUNT_PIN`` est secret et expurgé.
+
+    :param monkeypatch: Fixture pytest pour modifier temporairement l'environnement.
+    :return: None
+    """
+    monkeypatch.setenv("PRONOTE_ACCOUNT_PIN", "account-pin-42")
+    settings = load_settings()
+
+    assert isinstance(settings.pronote.account_pin, SecretStr)
+    assert settings.pronote.account_pin.get_secret_value() == "account-pin-42"
+    assert settings.pronote.account_pin in settings.redaction_secrets()
+    assert "account-pin-42" not in str(settings)
+    assert "account-pin-42" not in settings.model_dump_json()
+    assert "**********" in settings.model_dump_json()
+
+
 def test_sync_past_days_negative_direct_instantiation() -> None:
     """Vérifie que ``sync_past_days`` négatif lève ``ValidationError`` à l'instanciation.
 

tests/unit/test_pronote_client.py

@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import json
 import logging
+import traceback
 from collections.abc import Generator
 from contextlib import contextmanager
 from datetime import date, datetime
@@ -887,14 +888,17 @@ def test_get_informations_unchanged_in_password_mode(
     assert message.read is False
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("account_pin", [None, "account-pin-42"])
 def test_connect_password_mode_unchanged(
     mocker: pytest_mock.MockerFixture,
     pronote_settings: PronoteSettings,
+    account_pin: str | None,
 ) -> None:
     """Vérifie que le mode password conserve le comportement historique.
 
     :param mocker: Fixture pytest-mock pour le mocking.
     :param pronote_settings: Paramètres Pronote valides en mode password.
+    :param account_pin: PIN de compte éventuellement configuré.
     :return: None
     """
     from unittest.mock import Mock
@@ -904,7 +908,10 @@ def test_connect_password_mode_unchanged(
     mocker.patch("pronotepy.ParentClient", new=mock_client_class)
     mocker.patch("pronotepy.Client")
 
-    client = PronoteClient(pronote_settings, auth_state=None)
+    settings = pronote_settings.model_copy(
+        update={"account_pin": SecretStr(account_pin) if account_pin is not None else None}
+    )
+    client = PronoteClient(settings, auth_state=None)
     connected = client._connect()
 
     assert connected is mock_client
@@ -919,8 +926,10 @@ def test_connect_password_mode_unchanged(
     assert mock_client_class.call_count == 1
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("account_pin", [None, "account-pin-42"])
 def test_connect_qr_token_with_persisted_creds(
     mocker: pytest_mock.MockerFixture,
+    account_pin: str | None,
 ) -> None:
     """Vérifie le login par token persisté en mode qr_token.
 
@@ -928,6 +937,7 @@ def test_connect_qr_token_with_persisted_creds(
     ``token_login`` et le token rotate est resauvegardé.
 
     :param mocker: Fixture pytest-mock pour le mocking.
+    :param account_pin: PIN de second facteur facultatif.
     :return: None
     """
     creds = {
@@ -940,10 +950,26 @@ def test_connect_qr_token_with_persisted_creds(
     auth_state = mocker.MagicMock(spec=PronoteAuthState)
     auth_state.load.return_value = creds
 
-    mock_client = mocker.MagicMock()
+    mock_client: MagicMock = mocker.MagicMock()
     mock_client.logged_in = True
     mock_client.export_credentials.return_value = rotated_creds
-    mocker.patch("pronotepy.ParentClient.token_login", return_value=mock_client)
+
+    def token_login_fake(
+        pronote_url: str,
+        username: str,
+        password: str,
+        uuid: str,
+        account_pin: str | None = None,
+        client_identifier: str | None = None,
+        device_name: str | None = None,
+    ) -> MagicMock:
+        """Retourne le faux client avec la signature pronotepy 2.15.7."""
+        del pronote_url, username, password, uuid, account_pin, client_identifier, device_name
+        return mock_client
+
+    token_login = mocker.patch(
+        "pronotepy.ParentClient.token_login", autospec=True, side_effect=token_login_fake
+    )
 
     settings = PronoteSettings(
         url="https://pronote.example.com",
@@ -952,23 +978,27 @@ def test_connect_qr_token_with_persisted_creds(
         ent=None,
         account_type="parent",
         auth_mode="qr_token",
+        account_pin=SecretStr(account_pin) if account_pin is not None else None,
     )
     client = PronoteClient(settings, auth_state=auth_state)
     connected = client._connect()
 
     assert connected is mock_client
-    pronotepy.ParentClient.token_login.assert_called_once_with(**creds)  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    token_login.assert_called_once_with(**creds, account_pin=account_pin)
     auth_state.save.assert_called_once_with(rotated_creds)
 
 
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("account_pin", [None, "account-pin-42"])
 def test_connect_qr_token_no_creds_with_qr_code(
     mocker: pytest_mock.MockerFixture,
     tmp_path: Path,
+    account_pin: str | None,
 ) -> None:
     """Vérifie l'enrôlement initial par QR code quand aucun token n'est persisté.
 
     :param mocker: Fixture pytest-mock pour le mocking.
     :param tmp_path: Répertoire temporaire de test.
+    :param account_pin: PIN de second facteur facultatif.
     :return: None
     """
     qr_file = tmp_path / "qr_code.json"
@@ -991,10 +1021,26 @@ def test_connect_qr_token_no_creds_with_qr_code(
         "password": "new-token",  # pragma: allowlist secret
         "uuid": "new-uuid",
     }
-    mock_client = mocker.MagicMock()
+    mock_client: MagicMock = mocker.MagicMock()
     mock_client.logged_in = True
     mock_client.export_credentials.return_value = creds
-    mocker.patch("pronotepy.ParentClient.qrcode_login", return_value=mock_client)
+
+    def qrcode_login_fake(
+        qr_code: dict[str, str],
+        pin: str,
+        uuid: str,
+        account_pin: str | None = None,
+        client_identifier: str | None = None,
+        device_name: str | None = None,
+        skip_2fa: bool = False,
+    ) -> MagicMock:
+        """Retourne le faux client avec la signature pronotepy 2.15.7."""
+        del qr_code, pin, uuid, account_pin, client_identifier, device_name, skip_2fa
+        return mock_client
+
+    qrcode_login = mocker.patch(
+        "pronotepy.ParentClient.qrcode_login", autospec=True, side_effect=qrcode_login_fake
+    )
 
     settings = PronoteSettings(
         url="https://pronote.example.com",
@@ -1005,15 +1051,16 @@ def test_connect_qr_token_no_creds_with_qr_code(
         auth_mode="qr_token",
         qr_code_file=str(qr_file),
         qr_pin=SecretStr("123456"),
+        account_pin=SecretStr(account_pin) if account_pin is not None else None,
     )
     client = PronoteClient(settings, auth_state=auth_state)
     connected = client._connect()
 
     assert connected is mock_client
-    qrcode_login = pronotepy.ParentClient.qrcode_login
+    qrcode_login.assert_called_once()
-    qrcode_login.assert_called_once()  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
+    kwargs = qrcode_login.call_args.kwargs
-    kwargs = qrcode_login.call_args.kwargs  # type: ignore[attr-defined]
     assert kwargs["pin"] == "123456"
+    assert kwargs["account_pin"] == account_pin
     assert kwargs["qr_code"] == {
         "login": "testuser",
         "jeton": "qr-jeton",
@@ -1390,6 +1437,12 @@ def test_no_secrets_in_rotation_error_messages(
     assert sentinel_pin not in caplog.text
     assert sentinel_token not in caplog.text
     assert "sentinel-url" not in caplog.text
+    assert exc_info.value.__cause__ is None
+    assert exc_info.value.__context__ is None
+    formatted_traceback = "".join(traceback.format_exception(exc_info.value))
+    assert sentinel_pin not in formatted_traceback
+    assert sentinel_token not in formatted_traceback
+    assert "sentinel-url" not in formatted_traceback
 
 
 def test_no_raw_secrets_in_logs(
@@ -1412,6 +1465,7 @@ def test_no_raw_secrets_in_logs(
     sentinel_token = "SENTINEL_RAW_TOKEN_ALPHA"
     sentinel_pin = "SENTINEL_RAW_PIN_BRAVO"
     sentinel_jeton = "SENTINEL_RAW_JETON_CHARLIE"
+    sentinel_account_pin = "SENTINEL_RAW_ACCOUNT_PIN_DELTA"
 
     qr_file = tmp_path / "qr_code.json"
     qr_file.write_text(
@@ -1436,6 +1490,7 @@ def test_no_raw_secrets_in_logs(
         "pronotepy.ParentClient.token_login",
         side_effect=pronotepy.PronoteAPIError(
             f"login refusé {sentinel_token} puis {sentinel_pin} puis {sentinel_jeton} "
+            f"puis {sentinel_account_pin}"
         ),
     )
 
@@ -1448,6 +1503,7 @@ def test_no_raw_secrets_in_logs(
         auth_mode="qr_token",
         qr_code_file=str(qr_file),
         qr_pin=SecretStr(sentinel_pin),
+        account_pin=SecretStr(sentinel_account_pin),
     )
     client = PronoteClient(settings, auth_state=auth_state)
 
@@ -1459,10 +1515,19 @@ def test_no_raw_secrets_in_logs(
     assert sentinel_token not in message
     assert sentinel_pin not in message
     assert sentinel_jeton not in message
+    assert sentinel_account_pin not in message
     assert caplog.text
     assert sentinel_token not in caplog.text
     assert sentinel_pin not in caplog.text
     assert sentinel_jeton not in caplog.text
+    assert sentinel_account_pin not in caplog.text
+    assert exc_info.value.__cause__ is None
+    assert exc_info.value.__context__ is None
+    formatted_traceback = "".join(traceback.format_exception(exc_info.value))
+    assert sentinel_token not in formatted_traceback
+    assert sentinel_pin not in formatted_traceback
+    assert sentinel_jeton not in formatted_traceback
+    assert sentinel_account_pin not in formatted_traceback
 
 
 # --- Persistence of credentials after data operations ---